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Abstract
This paper considers firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when de-
mand is uncertain and correlated. Before demand is realized, two firms invest in their
local capacity, and provider(s) of flexible resources invest in their capacity. After demand
is realized, firms make their investment decision in flexible resource. I find that market
power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while
competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand
correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible
resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if
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1 Introduction
For firms in various industries, capacity investment decision involves investing early in their
own capacity before demand for their products is realized, and such investment is di cult to
reverse. After the demand is realized, firms have the option to undertake a second investment
in a flexible resource to accommodate the excess demand. In IT, cloud computing represents a
flexible resource: cloud computing is fundamentally the leasing of computer services, including
computing power and storage, but on an unprecedented scale. While local computing capacity
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can support the average demand of the firm, cloud computing is able to scale services on
demand and accommodate the workload that exceeds what the local capacity can handle.1
Accordingly, firms can use cloud computing as a flexible resource for business continuity and
disaster recovery plans.2 Electricity o↵ers another example. In developing countries, since the
provision of electricity is not very reliable, firms have to decide whether to buy electricity from
public utilities, which deliver instant services (hence, the more flexible resource), or to invest
in their own private generators. In addition to IT and electricity, in property, firms have to
decide whether to rent or buy o ce space; in transport, people have to decide whether to take
flexible public transport or buy their own private cars. Thus, flexibility here can be defined as
anything that transforms fixed costs to variable costs (or simply “anything as a service” in the
case of the Internet).
Another important characteristic of these markets is that demand is uncertain and corre-
lated, and the providers of flexible resources need to make their capacity choices under these
circumstances. For instance, in the cloud computing market, computing demand is uncertain
as demand varies daily; and correlated globally and seasonally. For example, a U.S. cloud
provider such as Amazon, Google and Microsoft may have customers from Europe as well as
Australia. Correlation is therefore driven to some extent by geography: computing demands
from countries that are close to each other are positively correlated; demands from countries
that are located in di↵erent time zones are negatively correlated. Moreover, retailers increase
computing demand during the holiday season;3 and businesses need more computing power
during the tax season. As argued by Harms and Yamartino (2010), even the largest cloud
provider will not be able to fully resolve issues related to uncertainty and correlation by ag-
gregating demand. Similarly, time and weather are well-known common drivers of correlated
demand in electricity and transport: household consumption of electricity tends to peak in the
evening, while workplace consumption tends to peak in the daytime; and people most want a
taxi during rush hour, holidays, and under bad weather condition.
It is likely that under demand uncertainty, the investments in di↵erent resources may be
ine cient, depending on the strength of demand correlation and the costs of the resources.
However, the existing literature has failed to explain why such ine ciencies may happen and
to discuss the remedies, which is the subject of this paper. More specifically, this paper
focuses on the problem of capacity investment in two resources when demand is uncertain and
correlated. In the cloud computing example, capacity is a key part of competition in this
industry. In the introductory phase, it is common that cloud providers build far more capacity
than needed, and one does not expect capacity to be an issue in this growing phase. However,
as cloud computing enters a more mature phase, capacity may become constrained as demand
1The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology provides five defining characteristics of cloud
computing: on-demand service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service.
This paper focuses on the definition of on-demand service and rapid elasticity.
2Business continuity and disaster recovery plans minimize any disruption of business operation due to
insu cient local capacity or failure of critical systems.
3See “Black Friday: Websites swamped by record demand,” BBC News, 28 November 2014, available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30242124.
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grows quickly.45 For example, on 25 August 2013, Amazon seems to struggle to keep up with
the growing computing demand, and an IT problem at one of its datacenters has caused many
users of major web services such as Instagram, Netflix, Vine and Airbnb to experience lengthy
delays and reduced data transfer speeds for several hours.6 Amazon’s web stores, Microsoft
Azure and its outlook.com, Google’s Gmail service and its YouTube video site have had faced
similar glitches. This raises the interesting questions of what the profit-maximizing investment
strategy in flexible resource is, such that the problem of quality degradation can be avoided,
and of how we should promote e cient investment from a public policy perspective.
In this model, two firms, whose demand is uncertain and correlated, make their investment
decision in local resource. Observing firms’ local investment, providers of flexible resource (e.g.
Amazon, Google and Microsoft) decide how much to invest in capacity, and set the price for
their flexible resource (e.g. Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Compute Engine, Microsoft
Azure). After demand is realized, firms can buy flexible resources if demand exceeds their local
capacity. It is worth noting that I use the “firm” to refer to the seller of final services to the
consumers, and the “provider” to refer to the supplier of flexible resources. Thus, there are two
parties investing: the “firm” chooses between fixed and flexible resources, and the “provider”
invests in its flexible capacity.
I consider both cases of monopoly and duopoly in providing the flexible resource. As should
be expected, investment is suboptimal in the monopoly market. Particularly, the provider of
the flexible resource tends to underinvest in its capacity with respect to the socially optimal
level, whereas firms tend to overinvest in their local capacity. Such ine ciency comes from
market power of the monopolist. Firms invest in local capacity to avoid being exploited by the
monopolist, which in turn reduces investment incentive of the monopolist.
Competition mitigates the underinvestment problem, and the extent of improvement de-
pends crucially on demand correlation and the cost of capacity. Both socially optimal and
monopoly investment in flexible resource increases with correlation if the investment cost of
flexible resource is small enough, and decreases with correlation if the flexible resource is costly.
The reason is that as correlation increases, the social planner and the provider either “win big”
when demand realization of the two firms is high or “lose big” when demand realizations of the
two firms is low. If the flexible resource is cheap, the social planner and the provider need not
worry about “losing”. Rather, they will focus on reaping benefits from the “winning” outcome,
and therefore they invest more as correlation increases. On the contrary, if the flexible resource
is expensive, then “losing” is costly, and thus they invest less as correlation increases.
Under duopoly, using numerical examples, I show that investment in flexible resource is
increasing in correlation. The reason for not observing the negative relationship between in-
4International Data Corporation (IDC) estimates that worldwide spending on public cloud services is ex-
pected to reach $47.4 billion in 2013 and $107 billion in 2017, which represents a growth rate five times that of
the IT industry as a whole.
5Capacity can be interpreted in two ways: number of physical servers or service quality. In the former case,
there is a maximum tra c that each server can handle. In the latter case, even if the capacity does not hit the
limit, high demands can put a costly strain on servers, which results in poor quality of service.
6See “Instagram, Vine and Netflix hit by Amazon glitch,” BBC News, 26 August 2013, available at http:
//www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-23839901.
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vestment and correlation in this case, as opposed to the social optimum and the monopoly
case, is that firms rely more on the flexible resource as competition between providers lowers
the price of flexible resources. As correlation increases, firms’ incentive to capture the windfall
from the “winning” of high demand realizations increasingly outweighs their incentive to avoid
the risk of “losing”. Knowing this, each provider is willing to build a bigger capacity of flexible
resources. These results suggest that information on the cost condition and the degree of de-
mand correlation have important consequences for investment. They also explain the need for
far more data on costs and demand in order to underpin the appropriate degree of competition.
More generally, these results can be applied to similar issues that arise in other markets (e.g.
the markets for cloud computing and the “sharing economy”) even in the presence of spot
pricing, which I will discuss in more detail in the penultimate section.
This paper extends the literature in three ways. First, it focuses on investment in two
types of resources. Second, it considers uncertain and correlated demand. Third, it provides
the conditions (in terms of investment costs and demand correlation) under which it is optimal
for the social planner and it is profitable for the firms to invest in two di↵erent resources. There
are three strands of related work, but they focus on only some of these aspects but not all.
First, this paper is closely related to the literature on capacity-pricing games, which dates
back to Kreps and Sheinkman (1983), and then extended by Reynolds and Wilson (2000) and
de Frutos and Fabra (2011) to incorporate demand uncertainty. Building on their results, we
study firms’ choices between two types of resources, and introduce both demand uncertainty
and demand correlation. This also distinguishes our work from Goyal and Netessine (2007)
and Anupindi and Jiang (2008), where firms cannot invest in both fixed and flexible resources
at the same time. However, as discussed earlier, it is common for firms (e.g. in IT, electricity,
property and transport) to invest in local capacity to accommodate the average demand and
use flexible resources to better manage unexpected rises and falls in demand.7
Another related strand is the literature on operational management. For example, Lee
(2009) studies the optimal capacity investment of a computing service provider in a single
resource, and Niyato, Chaisiri and Lee (2009) study the optimal choice between private and
public computing services in the monopoly and oligopoly markets, but in a setting without
demand correlation. By incorporating demand correlation, an interesting finding of this paper
is that investment can increase with correlation, which is in contrast to the common belief
that only negative correlations are valuable because the provider can aggregate demand and
reduces the risk.8 The reason is that when capacity is cheap, the “win big” e↵ect prevails;
thus, providers invest more as correlation increases.
Other papers in operational management have failed to address the divergence in the in-
vestment behavior between the social planner and the firms, and more importantly, how to
correct the problem of suboptimal investment. For example, Van Miegham (1998), and Bish
and Wang (2004) study the optimal investment strategy in flexible resources when a monop-
7The choice between fixed and flexible resources also relates to the literature on make-or-buy and outsourcing
decisions. See Tadelis and Williamson (2013) and Bresnahan and Levin (2013) for excellent surveys of this
literature, but the issue of demand correlation has not yet been studied there.
8See, for instance, p. 218 of Bayrak et al. (2011).
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olist faces uncertain demands for its two products, which corresponds to the socially optimal
regime in this paper.
Finally, this paper is loosely related to the literature on real options (RO) in finance, which
focuses on the role of RO in providing flexibility to management decisions. Unlike financial
assets, capacity investments in IT are not tradable, and are therefore not valued based on levels
of risk, but instead they are priced by a third party, which is the resource provider in this model.
Thus, the study of the investment incentives of resource providers is important here, but not
in RO literature. See, for instance, Angelou and Economides (2005), Benaroch and Kau↵man
(1999) and Kau↵man et al. (2002) for details on the limitation of RO’s applicability in IT
investments.
2 The Model
Consider two firms, 1 and 2, that need to build capacity in order to serve their customers. To
do this, they can either invest in their own local resource L or they can buy flexible resources K
from the market. The di↵erence lies in that investments in local resources are irreversible and
these resources are for the exclusive use of the investing firm, while flexible resources can be
bought from the market instantly when needed and released when not needed. An example of
flexible resources is cloud computing as cloud computing power is provisioned as an on-demand
service.
Investment technology. The unit cost of local resource and flexible resource are denoted by
cL and cK respectively. I assume that local resource is supplied competitively, so that firms
can buy L at a price cL. The flexible resource market can be either a monopoly or a duopoly.
Hereafter, the seller of final services to the consumers is referred to as the “firm”, and the
supplier of flexible resources that may be used in lieu of local resources in the production of
such services is referred to as the “provider”.
Demand. Each consumer of a firm has inelastic demand, with willingness to pay of r.9 The
demand (e.g. the total number of consumers) of each firm is uncertain, and the demands of
the two firms are correlated. More specifically, demands for firms 1 and 2, denoted by x and
y respectively, are drawn from a joint distribution h(x, y), with support [0,1) ⇥ [0,1). The
demand of firm 1, x, is given by the marginal distribution f(x) =
R1
0 h(x, y)dy. Similarly,
the demand of firm 2, y, is given by g(y) =
R1
0 h(x, y)dx. In the following analysis, I focus
on the case where demands (x, y) follow an exponential distribution with   = 1,10 but in
Appendix E, I show that the main results carry through in the linear case. More particularly,
the exponential distribution can be described as follows. The marginal distributions F (x) and
9Qualitative results for the monopoly case would be similar if we consider elastic demand. As for the duopoly
case, however, if we consider elastic demand, we can no longer follow the approach of de Frutos and Fabra (2011),
who study a sequential capacity-price game under demand uncertainty with price-inelastic demands. Interested
reader can see Reynolds and Wilson (2000) for a discussion of the two-stage game under the assumption of
downward-sloping and uncertain demand.
10A distribution is exponential when F ( , x) = 1   e  x is satisfied.
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G(y) and marginal densities f(x) and g(y) are respectively
F (x) =1  e x,
G(y) =1  e y,
f(x) =e x,
g(y) =e y.
The joint distribution function H(x, y) and joint density function h(x, y) follow Gumbel (1960):
H(x, y) =(1  e x)(1  e y)(1 + ↵e x y),
h(x, y) =e x y[1 + ↵(2e x   1)(2e y   1)],
where  1 < ↵ < 1 is a measure of correlation.11
We consider the following game:
• Stage 1: firms 1 and 2 invest in their own local capacity L1 and L2 simultaneously;
• Stage 2: the provider(s) invest(s) in capacity of flexible resources K;
• Stage 3: the provider(s) set(s) a per unit price of flexible resource p;
• Stage 4: demands (x, y) are realized and firms decides whether and how much to buy the
flexible resource.12
For simplicity, I make the following assumptions. First, r > cL, so there is incentive to
purchase local resources. Second, I focus on the more interesting case where cK < cL because
the value of flexible resources is the highest. If, instead, cL < cK , then the social planner
will invest in a positive amount of local resources; value of flexible resources would be lower.
Moreover, it is common in practice that cloud computing exhibits significant economies of
scale (the market for cloud computing will be discussed in detail in Section 6). To facilitate
our analysis, I focus on the specification with r = 1, cL = 0.5 and cK 2 [0, 0.5].13 Third, when
firms are indi↵erent between buying and not buying the flexible resource, they will always buy.
The solution concept adopted here is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
11Strictly speaking, ⇢ = cov(x,y)p
var(x)var(y)
is the coe cient of correlation, but since ↵ and ⇢ move in the same
direction (more precisely, ⇢ = ↵4 , see Equation (3.10) on p. 706 of Gumbel (1960)), there is no loss of generality
in saying that ↵ is a measure of correlation.
12The timing of this model, where firms invest first, fits the scenario where some flexible resources such as
cloud computing o↵ers more flexibility in managing demand uncertainty than local resources. However, one
could alternatively consider the case where firms observe the provider’s investment in flexible resources before
deciding their own local investment. In this setting, firms still overinvest in L, and providers still underinvest
in K, provided price is chosen after the capacity decision because the monopoly price will emerge as long
as demand is inelastic. Another alternative is to consider the case where p is chosen prior to L, but the
underinvestment problem will still occur because the provider will never price at marginal cost (at least under
linear pricing) as its profit will become zero and it will not have any incentive to invest. Moreover, it is di cult
to think of a situation in practice that fits the scenario of choosing price prior to capacity.
13These assumptions are innocuous for two reasons. First, setting r = 1 is only a normalization, and it
will not a↵ect the qualitative conclusion. Second, the main results hold more generally as long as the flexible
resource is more e cient, i.e. cK < cL.
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3 Social Optimum
The social planner chooses L1, L2 and K so as to maximize social welfare, which is defined as
expected demand served minus investment costs (i.e. E(x+ y)  cKK   cL(L1 + L2)). Figure
1 illustrates the basic structure of the demand for flexible resources.
y
x
L1 L1+K
L2
L2+K
Area Demand for Flexible Resources
I1
I1
I2
I2II
II
Ø
Ø
III
III
IV
IV
V
V
0
x-L1
y-L2
x+y-(L1+L2)
K
K
K
Figure 1: Demand for Flexible Resources.
In Area ;, both firms have su cient local capacity to serve their customers, and therefore
there is no demand for flexible resources. Area I1 captures the situation where firm 2’s local
capacity is enough to cover its demand, but firm 1’s demand exceeds its local capacity and
will therefore purchase flexible resources. Area I2 illustrates the reverse situation when only
firm 2 buys flexible resources. In Area II, both firms buy flexible resources. In all the cases
above, all demands are served. Area III represents the situation where firm 1 has enough local
capacity, while firm 2 has too much demand such that the provider of flexible resources is
capacity constrained. Area IV shows the reverse situation: firm 1 has too much demand, while
firm 2’s local capacity is su cient. Area V captures the situation where the demands of both
firms are extremely high such that it exhausts the capacity of the flexible resource provider.
Thus the social welfare is given by
max
L1,L2,K
S =
Z
;+I1+I2+II
(x+ y)h(x, y)dydx+
Z
III
(x+ L2 +K)h(x, y)dydx
+
Z
IV
(L1 +K + y)h(x, y)dydx+ (L1 + L2 +K)
Z
V
h(x, y)dydx
  cKK   cL(L1 + L2). (1)
Let ⌦(L1, L2, K) denote the probability of (x, y) falling in areas {III}+ {IV }+ {V }. The
social planner only invests in flexible resources, and the socially optimal investment is given by
⌦(0, 0, K) = 1 
Z K
0
Z K x
0
h(x, y)dydx = cK .
The optimal capacity is such that the social marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. Let L⇤
and K⇤ denote the solutions of Equation (1).
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Proposition 1. The social planner only invests in the flexible resource (i.e. L⇤ = 0 and
K⇤ > 0). Moreover, there exists c¯ such that the socially optimal investment in flexible resource
K⇤ increases with demand correlation ↵ if cK  c¯, but decreases with demand correlation if
cK > c¯.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The social planner only invests in flexible resources because cK < cL. As the demand
correlation increases, the probability of getting either high demand realizations or low demand
realizations from both firms increases, meaning firms either “win big” or “lose big”. The impact
of an increase in demand correlation therefore depends on the cost of the flexible resource. If
the investment cost is su ciently low, then “losing” is cheap and the social planner would
focus on reaping the benefits of high demand realizations. Therefore, investment increases
with correlation for low cost. On the contrary, if investment cost is large enough, the social
planner aims at minimizing the risk of “losing”, so investment decreases with correlation.
4 Monopoly
Suppose now that there is a monopoly provider for the flexible resource that chooses p and K
to maximize its expected profit. Since each consumer has inelastic demand, each firm will set
the price equal to r. This means that a firm will buy flexible resources to serve its customers
whenever the price for flexible resource is less than r—in other words, firms’ demand for flexible
resources is also inelastic. Given L1, L2, K and monopoly price pm, the demand for flexible
resource is the same as in Figure 1 as long as pm  r. As the monopolist can extract all the
value of the flexible resource, it is obvious that
pm = r (2)
in Stage 3.
The investment of the provider is determined by
⌦(L1, L2, K) = 1 
Z L
0
Z L+K
0
h(x, y)dydx+
Z L+K
L
Z 2L+K x
0
h(x, y)dydx = cK , (3)
In Stage 1, firm 1, expecting that pm = r, chooses its local capacity L1 so as to maximize
its profit:
max
L1
Z L1
0
xf(x)dx+
Z 1
L1
L1f(x)dx  cLL1.14
The first two terms show that the whole demand is served when demand is below local capacity,
whereas capacity is saturated when demand exceeds local capacity. The last term represents
the total spending in local capacity.
Then, the first-order condition determines the equilibrium investment of L1:
1  F (L1)  cL. (4)
14The firm only gets positive profit from its local capacity because the surplus of the consumers, who are
served by utilizing the flexible resource, are extracted entirely.
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The second-order condition is also satisfied.
Analogously, for firm 2, the equilibrium investment of L2 is determined by
1 G(L2)  cL. (5)
The market equilibrium is characterized by Equations (2), (3), (4) and (5). Let Lm and Km
denote the solutions of this set of equations. It is clear that the monopoly case is di↵erent from
the social optimum because firms invest in a positive amount of local capacities, and it is also
di↵erent from the duopoly case because firms’ investments are independent of the provider?s
investment strategy.
Proposition 2. The monopolistic flexible resource provider underinvests in the flexible resource
relative to the social optimum (Km < K⇤), while the firms overinvest in their local capacity
(Lm > L⇤).
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. The monopolist sells the flexible resource
at the monopoly price, which extracts all consumer surplus. Anticipating this, the firm will
invest in L, even if L is the less e cient technology compared with K, in order to gain part of
the consumer surplus. As a consequence, the benefit of investing in the flexible resource is lower
for the monopolist than for the social planner, and hence the monopolist underinvests. Notice
that Proposition 2 holds more generally for any rationing rule. The reason is that firms pay the
monopoly price and, thus, all their profits in serving a customer with the flexible resource are
extracted, so rationing rules do not a↵ect firms’ profits and hence their investment incentives.
To solve the problem, the regulator can ban local investments of the firms. However, this is
a rather heavy-handed approach. Firms may prefer local resources for a variety of legitimate
reasons. For instance, flexible resources are valuable for the firm as they o↵er the flexibility
to modify a prior investment strategy as more information becomes available over time. More
particularly, in case of “good news” the firm can scale up their services, and in case of “bad
news” it can scale down. Therefore, firms are willing to pay extra to buy the flexible resource
even though it is more expensive (pm > cL). Indeed, statistics shows that cloud computing is
appealing to industries that have high variability in data tra c such as medical research and
drug discovery in the healthcare sector.15
Therefore, I consider an alternative policy of increasing competition. Since surplus appro-
priation originates from market power, it seems reasonable to investigate whether introduc-
ing more competition in the market—thereby forcing down the price—would incentivize the
provider and the firms to behave optimally. This issue is particularly relevant to the market
for cloud computing, as providers, such as Amazon, Google, Microsoft, IBM, and Dropbox,
have been competing aggressively to lower the prices of their cloud storage over the past year.
The important question is then how competition would a↵ect investment decisions, and the
presence of demand correlation can make it even harder to answer. Indeed, as we will see later,
15World Economic Forum (2010) identifies the healthcare industry as one of the major sectors which can
benefit from cloud computing.
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the extent to which competition improves investment incentives is subtler than it appears as
it varies with demand correlation and investment cost.
Let us now turn to the impact of correlation.
Proposition 3. Under monopoly, there is a positive amount of local investment by the firms
(i.e. Lm > 0). Moreover, there exists c such that the monopolist’s investment in flexible resource
Km increases with demand correlation ↵ if cK  c, but decreases with demand correlation if
cK > c.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The impact of an increase in demand correlation on both socially optimal and equilibrium
investment depends on whether the flexible resource is significantly more e cient than the
local resource. The intuition of Proposition 3 is in the same spirit as Proposition 1. However,
the monopolist’s investment is more likely to be decreasing in demand correlation as shown in
the following corollary:
Corollary 1. The smallest cK under which investment in flexible resource decreases with de-
mand correlation is larger at the social optimum than under monopoly, i.e. c¯ > c.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is that local investment is zero at the social optimum but
positive in the monopoly case. Thus, while the monopolist has to bear the risk associated with
low demand, under which the firms will rely on their local capacity only, there is no such risk
under social optimum, making the social planner more willing to invest in flexible resources as
demand correlation increases compared to the monopolist.
It is also easy to show that the maximum number of consumers that can be served by each
firm is higher under social optimum than monopoly, i.e. K⇤ > Lm + Km.16 This is because
the social planner invests more in flexible resources, which is cheaper relative to fixed resources
and can be used by either firm.
5 Duopoly
Now consider competing providers, who compete in their prices, as in the case of Amazon AWS
versus Microsoft Azure. The timing of the game is the same as before.17 Local investments
in the first stage, L1 and L2, generate a stochastic demand function for the flexible resource
G(L1, L2) that is price-inelastic. The continuation game is a capacity-price game with demand
uncertainty, which is considered by de Frutos and Fabra (2011), henceforth FF. However, there
are two important di↵erences between this model and FF. First, FF only consider one type of
16Since one firm’s local capacity cannot be used by another firm, it seems more reasonable to use the maximum
capacity that one firm can deliver (i.e. Lm+Km) instead of the total capacity that both firms can deliver (i.e.
Lm + Lm +Km) as the basis of comparison.
17Since there is demand uncertainty, the classical result of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), who prove outcome
equivalence between the capacity-price game and the Cournot game, is not applicable.
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resources as opposed to two types in this model. Second, FF focus on the characterization of
the equilibrium capacity and price decisions under demand uncertainty and imperfect compe-
tition (i.e. under competition, how much should a firm invest and what price should it set?),
while here I focus on analyzing the same choice variables, but with welfare assessment under
monopoly and competition (i.e. will competition promote higher levels of welfare?).
To solve the continuation game, we can apply the following result of FF:
Lemma 1. (de Frutos and Fabra, 2011, Proposition 7, 8 and 9) Given L1 and L2, the only
equilibrium in the pricing stage is a mixed-strategy equilibrium; and capacity choices are asym-
metric. In particular, there is a large firm with capacity k+(L1, L2) and a small firm with
capacity k (L1, L2) < k+(L1, L2). Furthermore, if the density function of demand g(L1, L2) is
non-decreasing, then the equilibrium is unique.
The introduction of demand uncertainty rules out the existence of symmetric equilibria
because given the rival’s investment strategy, the marginal return of investment is di↵erent
between the large firm and the small firm.
Moving to the local investment stage, however, we can no longer follow FF’s analysis because
in FF, there is only one type of resources, which corresponds to the flexible resource in this
model. Moreover, they assume that demand is exogenously given, while the demand for flexible
resources in this paper is endogenously determined by investments in local capacity and the
strength of demand correlation. Therefore, unlike the monopoly case, firms’ investments are
no longer independent of the provider’s strategy, which poses two significant challenges for my
analysis. First, the endogenously determined demand function for the flexible resource is not
necessarily non-decreasing, which means that the equilibrium in the continuation game may
not be unique. If the equilibrium is not unique, I focus on the most “symmetric” case in the
sense that the di↵erence in capacity between the large firm and the smaller firm is minimized,
which in turn means that the degree of competitiveness is maximized.
Second, this introduces strategic interaction between the two firms: each firm’s investment
changes the total demand for flexible resources, which a↵ects providers’ investments and in turn
a↵ects the rival firm’s investment. The complexity of providers’ strategies in the pricing stage
makes it extremely di cult to characterize the objective function of each firm. Furthermore,
the analysis is complicated by the rationing rule, as di↵erent rationing rules generate di↵erent
expected profit for each firm. To simplify the analysis, I assume that L1 and L2 are chosen
cooperatively such that L1 = L2 = L, so that the rationing rule does not a↵ect investments in
local and flexible resources. The justification for this assumption is that di↵erent government
departments and di↵erent university departments may buy local resources (e.g. on-premise
computer servers) cooperatively, but each department cannot use other departments’ local
capacity.18 Under this assumption, the objective function of the two firms could be simply
represented by the maximization of their joint profit:
max
L
⇥
S(L)  ⇡+(L)  ⇡ (L)⇤  2cLL,
18Even though I assume cooperative investment, the two firms act di↵erently from the case with a single firm
because the two firms cannot share their local capacity, as illustrated by this example.
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where S(L) is the social surplus given by Equation (1), and ⇡+(L) and ⇡ (L) are the equilibrium
profits of the two providers of flexible resource. The surplus is shared between the firms and
the providers (but not the consumers). This is because demand is inelastic, so firms can extract
all consumer surplus.
Solving the above problem yields the equilibrium investment in local capacity Ld1 and L
d
2,
where d denotes duopoly. Then, we can also determine the equilibrium aggregate investment
in flexible resource Kd(Ld1, L
d
2).
Proposition 4. Under duopoly, investment in flexible resources is larger (Kd   Km), in-
vestment in local resources is smaller (Ld  Lm), and the price of flexible resources is lower
(pd  pm), compared to the monopoly case. Thus, competition always increases social welfare.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Competition increases welfare because it mitigates the underinvestment problem in flexible
resources and the overinvestment problem in local resources. In markets with price-inelastic
demands but without flexible investments, the introduction of competition has no e↵ect on
welfare because inelastic demand allows firms to extract the entire consumer surplus. However,
with investments, better technology choice improves welfare—a result that is absent in FF. FF
focus more on the optimal capacity choice under competition, but not on how competition
solves the divergence in investment incentives between the social planner and the monopolist
that is the focus of this model. More interestingly, I illustrate through the following numerical
example that the extent of improvement brought about by competition depends on the cost of
capacity and the degree of correlation.19
Figure 2 plots, for a given cK , flexible resource investment against demand correlation.
Social optimum is shown with a solid line, the duopoly case is drawn as a dotted line, and the
monopoly case is illustrated by a long-dashed line.
The main observations in Figure 2 are summarized in the following remark.
Remark 1. Comparing the socially optimal, monopoly and duopoly solutions,
(i) When cK is su ciently small, both the social planner’s investment in flexible resources
K⇤ and the monopolist’s investment in flexible resources Km increase with correlation ↵.
As cK approaches cL, both of these investments decrease with correlation. The threshold
level such that the impact of correlation changes is larger at the social optimum than it
is under monopoly.
(ii) Under duopoly, it can be shown that when demands are very positively or very negatively
correlated, the investment in flexible resource Kd is increasing in correlation ↵.
19The main di culty in solving for an explicit solution in the duopoly case stems from the fact that the
demand for flexible resources is endogenously determined by L and ↵, and this, in turn, a↵ects the mixed
strategy in prices of the provider. Consequently, it is di cult to characterize the profit function of the firm
without using a numerical method.
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(c) cK = 0.5
Figure 2: Flexible Resource Investment and Demand Correlation for di↵erent values of cK .
Part (i) is already shown in Propositions 1 and 3, and Corollary 1. As for part (ii), the
intuitive reason for not observing a negative relationship between investment and correlation
under duopoly, unlike the socially optimal and monopoly regimes, is as follows. Under the
socially optimal and monopoly regimes, local investment does not vary with correlation: at
the social optimum local investment is zero; in the monopoly case firms pay the monopoly
price, and thus their local investment is not a↵ected by correlation. Unlike these regimes, in
the duopoly case firms pay less than the monopoly price and are therefore more willing to
switch to buying the flexible resource in order to capture the possible windfall of high demand
realizations. As a consequence, firms invest less in local capacities, and hence providers invest
more in flexible resources as correlation increases.
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6 Discussion
In this section I discuss some policy issues in the markets for cloud computing and the “sharing
economy”.
6.1 The Market for Cloud Computing
Cloud computing has emerged as a new business model for computing and storage resource
management for firms, and a new source of entertainment and communication services for
consumers. As the cloud market is still in its infancy, many classic economic issues such as
pricing, investment strategies, the appropriate market structure, competition policy, privacy
and security concerns are still unclear.20 I take the first step to understand the impact of
competition on investment in this industry.
Although there are a number of competitors in the cloud computing market such as AWS,
Azure, Google and IBM/SoftLayer, market power exists. For instance, large cloud providers
build hyperscale datacenters that exhibit significant increasing returns to scale, which could
come from the centralization of computing resources or from volume discount on the compo-
nents that these providers use to build their datacenter.21 As a result, smaller firms may not
be able to compete with these incumbents. Moreover, many consumers prefer to buy services
from well-known brands because they expect higher quality. This raises concerns about the
degree of competition in this market.
This model predicts that the impact of competition on investment depends crucially on
the investment cost. It is often argued that cloud computing reduces the cost of investing in
computing power significantly. While the marginal cost of producing an extra unit of storage or
computing power is close to zero, the costs of electricity for powering up the machines, cooling
the systems, as well as management, maintenance and implementation of the software and
hardware in a large server farm is far from negligible.22 Also, although storing a large amount
20Recently, there has been a flurry of research on the opportunities and obstacles for the adoption of cloud
services; see, for example, Armbrust et al. (2009), Harms and Yamartino (2010), and Marston et al. (2011).
They mainly focus on three layers of the cloud architecture: infrastructure, platform, and application. However,
as argued in Bayrak et al. (2011), such categorization are useful only in defining technological di↵erences, but
not so much in analyzing their economic impact. Indeed the existing literature on cloud computing are mostly
descriptive, and only rarely is the problem approached from the theoretical perspective. Fershtman and Gandal
(2012) raise important economic issues of cloud computing such as changes in the strength of network e↵ects,
compatibility among software applications, the development of standards, and the market structure that should
emerge. However, most of these topics have already been well-documented in a separate literature; in order
to work on theoretical advancement, one needs to clearly delineate the unique features of the cloud computing
market.
Recent e↵orts to expand the theoretical study of cloud computing include Wang (2014), who studies the
adoption of cloud services within a moral hazard framework, and this paper. However, they di↵er in two
respects. First, this paper is about capacity investment, while Wang focuses on the problem of migration,
which means that there is no investment on the provider’s side. Second, this paper studies the e↵ect of
competition, but such e↵ect is absent in Wang.
21See Harms and Yamartino (2010) for more examples of how firms benefit from economies of scale.
22In September 2012, the New York Times reported that “the digital warehouses use about 30 billion watts
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of data is not necessarily expensive, managing large data sets and retrieving the relevant data
at the right time can be costly. Therefore, information on the cost structure in the cloud
computing market should be gathered and analyzed as it has important consequences for
investment.
6.2 Spot Pricing
Although it is always more e cient for firms to use the flexible resource, there are two reasons
that prevent everyone from using the flexible resource only: first, the stochastic nature of
demand prevents the provider from contracting over the amount of investment ex ante; second,
the provider of the flexible resource cannot commit to marginal-cost pricing. As a consequence,
firms rely more on local capacity and the provider underinvests.
Throughout the paper, I focus on non-contingent pricing.2324 This is because contingent
pricing is not very popular in the market for cloud computing: with the exception of AWS,
which uses both contingent and non-contingent pricing, other large cloud providers such as
Azure, Google and IBM rarely use spot pricing. On the contrary, in the electricity wholesale
market, electricity is bought and sold at spot prices.25 Yet, there is only one kind of capacity:
firms typically buy energy from electricity companies, but do not generate their own electricity
(although some firms may have their own emergency electricity generator, they are not for
regular use). As argued by Carr (2005) and Je↵ Bezos in Stone (2013), they both envisioned
today’s IT supply would transform from companies’ private capacity into a centralized utility
service, just like how electricity became a utility a century ago. It is therefore interesting to
think about how spot pricing can change investment incentives in an environment with both
flexible and local resources, as in the case of cloud computing, where firms buy flexible resources
for its instant scalability and own local resources for reasons of regulatory compliance, data
security and privacy. A formal model of contingent pricing would entail a trade-o↵ as follows:
the provider tends to price high during peak periods, which induces firms to invest more in
local capacity; but it tends to price low during o↵-peak periods, which induces firms to rely
more on flexible resources. Consequently, the extent to which investment is distorted depends
on the relative strength of these two e↵ects. If, for instance, the second e↵ect dominates, then
contingent pricing can potentially remedy the problem of underinvestment in flexible resources.
Despite this additional trade-o↵ created by contingent pricing, investment decision still depends
of electricity, roughly equivalent to the output of 30 nuclear power plants.”
23Non-contingent pricing means that prices are determined before demand is realized, whereas contingent
pricing are state-dependent.
24This paper focuses on linear pricing, but one can also think of other pricing structures such as non-linear
tari↵s. For example, cloud providers such as Amazon, Dropbox and Google use non-linear pricing for their
storage service: they provide basic service for free, and then o↵er additional storage capacity for a fee. It
is interesting to analyze the optimal nonlinear tari↵ under demand uncertainty, but such topic would require
substantial extension which is beyond the scope of this paper.
25The electricity literature (see, for instance, Borenstein and Holland (2005), Murphy and Smeers (2005),
Joskow and Tirole (2007), and Le´autier (2011)) mostly considers a two-stage game, in which firms choose their
capacity first, and then they bid prices for each state of the world in a spot market. See also Crew, Fernando
and Kleindorfer (1995) for a survey of the literature on peak-load pricing.
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fundamentally on the degree of correlation and the cost of capacity, and therefore all the main
qualitative results of this paper should remain valid.
Spot pricing is not only common for utilities, but it has also become more widely used
in other “sharing economy” marketplaces, where platforms such as Uber and Airbnb vary
their prices depending on demand. These platforms can similarly invest in multiple resources
(flexible vs. fixed) and demand is correlated across firms. For instance, Uber and Airbnb,
instead of owning the hotels/taxis and hiring their own sta↵s/drivers, act as intermediaries
between buyers and a group of independent contractors. Moreover, hotels have huge demand
spikes during holiday seasons, and people most want to share a car during busy times and
under bad weather. Thus, at a more general level, my results could be extrapolated to gain a
better understanding on investment decisions in these markets.
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources. I find
that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment, while
competition restores e ciency. The extent of improvement depends on demand correlation and
investment costs. If the investment cost is small, investment under social optimum, monopoly
and competition is increasing in correlation; if the cost is large, investment under competition
is still increasing in correlation, whereas that under social optimum and monopoly goes in
opposite direction.
These results have implications for investment decision on whether to outsource, particu-
larly in the market for cloud computing. Admittedly, the cloud computing market is growing
unpredictably, and there is no clear indication or consensus on how it will develop. For now,
this paper shows that even if the cloud computing market follows the footsteps of the electricity
market and providers eventually adopt spot pricing, a similar trade-o↵ that we derived here
will arise. Therefore, analyzing data on cost and demand represents a useful first step towards
a fuller understanding of the nascent industry.
I list some important topics that lie beyond the scope of this paper, but would be appropriate
for further work. The first is to consider product di↵erentiation. For example, assuming
that cloud computing services (such as Dropbox storage services) and local storage services
are di↵erentiated—how, then, would the investment strategy change? Second, it would be
interesting to study the consequences of vertical integration. For instance, what will happen
if upstream cloud computing firms such as Microsoft and Google also enter the downstream
market of software applications? Finally, one could examine the potential merits of policies
such as a subsidy for investment in flexible resource to remedy the underinvestment problem.
While a full analysis of the e↵ect of a subsidy (e.g. how to finance it) is beyond the scope
of this paper, preliminary analysis suggests that if the regulator were to introduce a subsidy
s for investment in flexible resources, the cost of flexible resources will become cK   s. The
provider will then be more willing to o↵er a lower price, and at the same time, it also has more
incentives to undertake investment in flexible resources, which could potentially mitigate the
underinvestment problem.
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Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
The social optimum is obtained by di↵erentiating Equation (1) with respect to L1, L2 and K.
The F.O.C. with respect to L1 is given by
{IV }+ {V }  cL.
Similarly, the F.O.C. with respect to L2 is
{III}+ {V }  cL.
Finally, the F.O.C. with respect to K is:
{III}+ {IV }+ {V }  cK .
As {III}+ {IV }+ {V } > {IV }+ {V } or {III}+ {V }, the marginal benefit of investing
in the flexible resource is always higher than that of local capacity. Furthermore, the marginal
cost of investing in the flexible resource is lower (cK < cL). Then we must have L⇤1 = L
⇤
2 = 0.
Since cK < cL < r, all F.O.C. are satisfied with equality.
The socially optimal investment in the flexible resource is determined by the F.O.C. with
respect to K, which can be rewritten as
F (K,↵, cK) =
Z K
0
Z K x
0
h(x, y)dydx  1 + cK = 0.
By implicit function theorem,
@K
@↵
=  
@F
@↵
@F
@K
.
We can show that
@F
@K
=
Z K
0
e K [1 + ↵(2e x   1)(2ex K   1)]dx
is positive. Moreover, we have
@F
@↵
=
Z K
0
Z K x
0
e x y(2e x   1)(2e y   1)dydx
=  e K [K + 3e K + 2Ke K   3].
It can be shown that there exists a K¯⇤ such that @F@↵ < 0 when K > K¯
⇤, and @F@↵ > 0 when
K < K¯⇤. In addition, it is obvious that K decreases with cK . Therefore, if cK is small such
that K > K¯⇤, then @K@↵ > 0. On the contrary, if cK is large, K is small such that K < K¯
⇤,
then @K@↵ < 0.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
For firm 1, its equilibrium investment is determined by
1  F (L1) = cL,
As 1  F (L1) > {IV }+ {V }, we must have Lm1 > L⇤1 = 0, and hence there is overinvestment.
The same happens for firm 2.
For the flexible resource provider, its equilibrium investment Km is determined by
max
K
⇧ =
Z L1
0
Z L2+K
L2
(y   L2)h(x, y)dydx+
Z L1+K
L1
Z L2
0
(x  L1)h(x, y)dydx
+
Z L1+K
L1
Z L1+L2+K x
L2
(x+ y   L1   L2)h(x, y)dydx
+K
Z L1
0
Z 1
L2+K
h(x, y)dydx+
Z 1
L1+K
Z L2
0
h(x, y)dydx
+
Z 1
L1
Z 1
L2
h(x, y)dydx 
Z L1+K
L1
Z L1+L2+K x
L2
h(x, y)dydx
 
  cKK.
which gives us
⌦(Lm1 , L
m
2 , K
m) = cK = ⌦(0, 0, K
⇤).
Suppose that the flexible resource provider invests K such that Lm + K = K⇤, Since
Lm > 0, it must be ⌦(Lm1 , L
m
2 , K) < ⌦(0, 0, K
⇤), which means such K cannot be the equilibrium.
Therefore, the flexible resource provider must investKm such that Lm+Km < K⇤, which means
that Km < K⇤ (underinvestment).
C Proof of Proposition 3
The monopolist’s investment is determined by
F (K,↵, cK) =
Z L
0
Z L+K
0
h(x, y)dydx+
Z L+K
L
Z 2L+K x
0
h(x, y)dydx  1 + cK = 0.
By implicit function theorem,
@K
@↵
=  
@F
@↵
@F
@K
.
It is straightforward to show that
@F
@K
=
Z L
0
e x L K [1 + ↵(2e x   1)(2e L K   1)]dx
+
Z L
0
e y L K [1 + ↵(2e y   1)(2e L K   1)]dy
+
Z L+K
L
e 2L K [1 + ↵(2e x   1)(2e x 2L K   1)]dy > 0,
@F
@↵
=
Z L
0
Z L+K
0
e x y(2e x   1)(2e y   1)dydx
+
Z L+K
L
Z 2L+K x
0
e x y(2e x   1)(2e y   1)dydx.
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Similar to the proof in Appendix A, there exists K¯m such that @F@↵ < 0 when K > K¯
m; and
@F
@↵ > 0 when K < K¯
m. Moreover, as Km is decreasing in cK , then if cK is small such that
K > K¯m, then @K@↵ > 0. On the contrary, if cK is such that K < K¯
m, then @K@↵ < 0.
D Proof of Corollary 1
From the proof in Appendices A and C, it su ces to show @F@↵
⇤
(K⇤) < @F@↵
m
(Lm, Km), where
both terms integrate the same function over the respective area as shown in Figure 3. The
di↵erence between @F@↵
⇤
(K⇤) and @F@↵
m
(Lm, Km) lies in the shaded area. Comparing integrations
over the triangles and the trapezium, we can conclude that the above condition is satisfied
because the triangles have higher values of x or y.
y
x
Lm+Km
K*
Lm+Km K*
Figure 3: Investment under Social Optimum and Monopoly.
We therefore have
• If @F@↵
m
< 0, then @F@↵
⇤
< 0. Both @K@↵
⇤
, @K@↵
m
> 0, which is true for small cK .
• If @F@↵
⇤
> 0, then @F@↵
m
> 0. Both @K@↵
⇤
, @K@↵
m
< 0, which is true for large cK .
• For medium cK , @F@↵
⇤
< 0 and @F@↵
m
> 0. Then, @K@↵
⇤
> 0 and @K@↵
m
< 0.
Thus, under social optimum there is a larger range of cK under which investment increases
with correlation as compared to the monopoly case.
E Linear Example
E.1 Social Optimum
The relationship between investment in flexible resource and demand correlation at the social
optimum is slightly di↵erent when demands are uniformly distributed. To see this, consider a
joint distribution h(x, y) as follows:
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• Positive correlation. With probability ⇢, only pairs of demands on the x = y line are
possible (perfect positive correlation). With probability 1   ⇢, demands are uniformly
distributed on a unit square [0, 1] ⇥ [0, 1] (independent demands). We can use ⇢ as a
measure of positive correlation.
• Negative correlation. With probability ⇢, only pairs of demands on the x+ y = 1 line are
possible (perfect negative correlation). With probability 1   ⇢, demands are uniformly
spread over a unit square [0, 1] ⇥ [0, 1] (independent demands). We can use  ⇢ as a
measure of negative correlation.
Since cK < cL < r, all the F.O.C. are satisfied with equality. In the case of positive
correlation, the optimal capacity is chosen such that the marginal benefit is equal to the
marginal cost:
⇢(1  K
2
) + (1  ⇢)1
2
(2 K)2 = cK .
Note that K   1 because cK  0.5. Di↵erentiating K with respect to ⇢, we find that K⇤
increases with ⇢.
In the case of negative correlation, we have
K⇤ = max
⇢
1, 2 
r
2cK
1  ⇢
 
.
Note that K   1. The reason is that if demands are perfectly negatively correlated and
investment is less than 1, then marginal benefit always exceeds cost. When K > 1, the optimal
investment is determined by
(1  ⇢)1
2
(2 K)2 = cK .
It is easy to see that K⇤ increases with  ⇢.
We therefore have
Result 1. In the case of uniformly distributed demands, the social planner only invests in the
flexible resource (i.e. L⇤ = 0 and K⇤ > 0), and the socially optimal investment K⇤ always
increases with demand correlation ⇢.
The reason is that, for uniformly distributed demands, the marginal benefit of expanding
capacity always increases as correlation increases.
E.2 Monopoly Case
In the monopoly case, the result in the linear example is the same as Proposition 3 in the main
text. To keep things simple, further assume that cK 2 [0.25, 0.5] such that L1+K and L2+K
are smaller than 1. In the case of positive correlation, the monopolist chooses K such that
⇢(
1
2
  K
2
) + (1  ⇢)(3
4
 K   1
2
K2) = cK .
In the case of negative correlation, the monopolist choice of K solves
⇢(1  2K) + (1  ⇢)(3
4
 K   1
2
K2) = cK .
We therefore have
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Result 2. In the case of uniformly distributed demands, there is a positive amount of local
investment by the firms (i.e. Lm > 0); and the monopolist’s investment in flexible resource Km
increases with demand correlation ⇢ if cK is small, but decreases with demand correlation if cK
approaches cL.
F Competition Improves Social Welfare
Competition increases social welfare because it mitigates the underinvestment and overinvest-
ment problem.
• Kd   Km: The F.O.C. of K in the monopoly case is
{III}+ {IV }+ {V } = cK .
As for the duopoly case, we refer to Equation (12) in FF: the F.O.C. of K is
1 D(K) = cK ,
whereD(K) is the demand for flexible resources. Since firms only buy the flexible resource
when demand is above their local capacity, this condition can be rewritten as
{III}+ {IV }+ {V }
1  R L10 R L20 h(x, y)dydx = cK .
Therefore, Kd   Km because 1   R L10 R L20 h(x, y)dydx < 1. Note that Kd = Km only
when L1, L2 = 0.
• pd  pm: Under duopoly, providers of the flexible resource randomize over price with the
upper bound of r (see Proposition 7 of FF).
• Ld  Lm: Firms invest less in local resource under duopoly because the price of it is
lower.
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